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Abstract 
To the person unfamiliar with the wide variety of street art, the 
term “street artist” conjures a young man furtively sneaking 
around a decaying city block at night, spray paint in hand, 
defacing concrete structures, ears pricked for police sirens. 
The possibility of the ethical criticism of street art on such a 
conception seems hardly worth the time. This has to be an 
easy question. Street art is vandalism; vandalism is causing the 
intentional damage or destruction of someone else’s property; 
causing destruction or damage is wrong. The only remaining 
question is which of two coarse-grained models of ethical 
criticism we choose. The ethicist model holds that a work of 
art that exhibits ethically bad properties is a work that is 
thereby aesthetically flawed. That is, the work is flawed as a 
work of art just because of its ethical flaws. Bad ethics make 
art worse than it otherwise would have been, although it may 
be aesthetically successful otherwise. The autonomist model, 
by contrast, holds that the ethical properties of a work of art 
have no bearing at all on its aesthetic success. One might 
suppose, therefore, that on either model, a criticism of street 
art would be relatively easy to undertake. In defacing public 
property, some street art exhibits and endorses ethically bad 
attitudes. On the ethicist model, such a work is thereby pro 
tanto aesthetically flawed because in the process of creating 
such works, they violate ethical norms concerning the use of 
public spaces; on the autonomous model, any ethical criticism 
of the aesthetics of street art would need to be set aside 
entirely in favor of criticism that focused purely on the 
aesthetic properties of street art. I will argue in this paper that 
neither the ethicist nor the autonomist model adequately 
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captures the moral landscape of street art. Street art may 
indeed be criticized productively on aesthetic grounds for the 
destruction it does to public spaces, but the existing models of 
ethical criticism overlook the complex ethical landscape of 
street art that results from its use of public spaces. In the 
interplay of various forms of street art we can see the 
emergence of an ethical criticism of art that is accomplished 
by the material properties of related artwork, and consists in 
the creation of a dialogue over the proper use of contested 
public spaces.   
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0. INTRODUCTION 
 
o the person unfamiliar with the wide variety of street 
art, the term “street artist” conjures a young man 
furtively sneaking around a decaying city block at night, 
spray paint in hand, defacing concrete structures, ears 
pricked for police sirens. The possibility of the ethical 
criticism of street art on such a conception seems hardly 
worth the time. This has to be an easy question. Street art is 
vandalism; vandalism is causing the intentional damage or 
destruction of someone else’s property; causing destruction 
or damage is wrong.i   
 
The only remaining question is which of two coarse-
grained models of ethical criticism we choose. The ethicist 
model holds that a work of art that exhibits ethically bad 
properties is a work that is thereby aesthetically flawed. 
That is, the work is flawed as a work of art just because of 
its ethical flaws. Bad ethics make art worse than it 
otherwise would have been, although it may be 
aesthetically successful otherwise.ii The autonomist model, 
by contrast, holds that the ethical properties of a work of art 
have no bearing at all on its aesthetic success.iii One might 
suppose, therefore, that on either model, a criticism of 
street art would be relatively easy to undertake. In defacing 
public property, some street art exhibits and endorses 
ethically bad attitudes. On the ethicist model, such a work 
is thereby pro tanto aesthetically flawed because in the 
process of creating such works, they violate ethical norms 
concerning the use of public spaces; on the autonomous 
model, any ethical criticism of the aesthetics of street art 
would need to be set aside entirely in favor of criticism that 
focused purely on the aesthetic properties of street art.  
 
I will argue in this paper that neither the ethicist nor the 
autonomist model adequately captures the moral landscape 
T 
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of street art. Street art may indeed be criticized 
productively on aesthetic grounds for the destruction it does 
to public spaces, but the existing models of ethical criticism 
overlook the complex ethical landscape of street art that 
results from its use of public spaces. In the interplay of 
various forms of street art we can see the emergence of an 
ethical criticism of art that is accomplished by the material 
properties of related artwork, and consists in the creation of 
a dialogue over the proper use of contested public spaces.   
 
1. ON STREET ART 
 
Riggle provides the definitive analysis of street art, and I 
will follow him here.iv Street art is characterized by two 
commitments: 
 
1. An artwork is street art if, and only if, its material use 
of the street is internal to its meaning.v  
2. Street art is highly ephemeral. 
 
Both commitments require some further explanation for my 
purposes here. To say that a work of art concerns the street 
is to make a claim about the content of the work and its 
relationship to public spaces. Riggle writes, “[…]the street, 
itself has meaning.[ …] These are shared spaces, ignored 
spaces, practical spaces, conflicted spaces, political 
spaces.”vi Understanding street art requires understanding 
the significance of how the artwork makes use of the space. 
A public work that can be understood without considering 
how its meaning relates to the street is thereby not a work 
of street art. As a result, not every work of art placed in the 
street concerns the street; Christo and Jean-Claude’s The 
Gates (2005) constituted a magnificent display of public 
art. Yet the art did not concern the street, and so while it 
was art open to the public that could be presented only 
along the paths of Central Park, it is not an example of 
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street art because it does not materially concern the street in 
its internal meaning. We may therefore understand “inter-
nal meaning” counterfactually; the meaning of the street is 
internal to the work if the work loses its meaning once 
removed from the street. Likewise, if a work of street art is 
removed from its urban setting and preserved in a museum, 
the meaning of the work is diminished, “devoid of its 
distinctive meaning.”vii One might draw an analogy with 
ceremonial or religious artwork that, when preserved in a 
museum setting, becomes harder to appreciate without 
significant efforts to provide context. Riggle’s definition of 
street art thus implies that to make sense of street art, one 
must attend to how the artwork makes use of the street. 
 
Street art is also characterized by a commitment to ephem-
erality. Because street art makes material use of the street, 
public spaces that are owned civically or privately, street 
art is often (though not always) illegal. As a result, street 
art carries with it no expectation that the work has any 
claim to be preserved. It may last minutes, hours, or years, 
but ultimately, the street determines the fate of the artwork. 
By contrast, a public installation like The Gates carries with 
it the expectation that the work should be protected from 
destruction, that while the work is presented in a public 
space, it is not of the street, and that the artist has made 
provisions for the eventual removal of the work. In such 
cases, the recognized artworld projects itself from the 
museums into the street, molding the public space into an 
outdoor artspace, and the norms of the museum apply.  
 
So conceived, street art is antithetical to the institution-
alized artworld. Contemporary street art grew out of the 
resurgence of graffiti culture in New York and other urban 
spaces in the 1970s. The institutional artworld erects 
barriers to universal participation. To exhibit work in a 
museum requires being recognized by the artworld as an 
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artist, and to view institutional artwork requires choosing to 
go to acurated space, perhaps paying a fee. The institutional 
artworld is thus removed from everyday life, and implicitly 
claims that its decisions confer artistic status on a work.  
 
Graffiti, in contrast, was not only illegal, regarded as 
vandalism and in some cases aggressively targeted by civic 
authorities, but also it was not recognized as a form of art 
by traditional institutions, nor were the graffiti taggers 
recognized as artists by the institutional artworld. As a 
result, graffiti culture and its ethos grew up on the margins. 
To be of the street meant to be excluded, and liberated, 
from institutional structures. Roughly, street art may be 
characterized by its unapologetic use of public space. 
Anyone can participate in street art; no need to wait for a 
curator to decide whether a work is an artwork. The street 
will decide the fate of an art attempt, whether it is lauded, 
destroyed, or ignored. 
 
As street art matured and became “respectable”, so did its 
ethos. Not all street art is destructive; some of it is merely 
illicit, not illegal; and some street artists, like HOTTEA, are 
recognized by the artworld, working sometimes in street art 
and sometimes in other institutionally recognized mediums. 
On Riggle’s model, the ethos of street art lies in its twin 
commitments to the potential for universal participation 
and ephemerality.   
 
Note that a work of art need not be illegal, destructive, or 
damaging in order to qualify as street art. The twin 
requirements of material use of the street and the 
commitment to ephemerality suggest that we can expect 
that much street art will violate the law or damage public 
property. Public spaces are owned by someone other than 
the artist, and contemporary street art owes its origins to the 
resurgence of graffiti culture in the early 1980s, and so 
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destruction and street are linked historically. But if Riggle’s 
definition is correct, that link is merely contingent. Street 
art cannot be sanctioned by the artworld, but street art does 
not exclude works whose material use of the street is 
internal to their meaning simply because they inhabit a 
legal grey area and do not significantly damage the public 
sphere. For example, Shelley Miller creates intricate murals 
using edible sugar icing and a pastry bag. Her work Cargo 
(2009), installed in Montreal, depicts the ships that carried 
slaves and sugar into Montreal ports in a sugar mural 
designed in the style of the ceramic azulejo.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Shelley Miller, Cargo (2009). © Shelley Miller. Image 
credit: shelleymillerstudio.com. 
 
 
Miller is joined by other artists whose work is what I will 
identify as non-destructive. Street art is non-destructive 
when its removal from the public sphere can be effected 
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without incurring significant time, effort, or expense to 
restore the public space. Often, the materiality of the work 
will determine its non-destructiveness; chalk, sugar, and 
textiles are much easier to remove than spray paint. But 
materiality alone is not sufficient as the placement of the 
artwork (e.g. on an overpass) may make it more difficult to 
remove. Much more would need to be said to give a 
complete definition of non-destructiveness, but for my 
purposes here, all I need is to get the seed that some street 
art does not involve obvious vandalism to germinate.  
 
Cargo astounds with its intricacy; it is a work of art. It is 
also a work of street art. It materially concerns the street, 
because the work, crafted from sugar, links the port of 
Montreal with the sugar trade; removed from the street, it 
would lose much of its meaning. Cargo is preserved only in 
photographs, as the medium of sugar icing itself is 
particularly ephemeral, subject to the elements, decaying 
and crumbling with time, as fragile as our historical 
memory. Yet Cargo isn’t clearly illegal (perhaps a form of 
littering?) but more importantly, the meaning of the work 
does not depend on the particulars of its legality, but on its 
violation of tacit norms of how to comport oneself in a 
public space.  
 
To interact with a public space is to immerse oneself in 
ethical, political, and social norms. Some norms of the 
street are established by civic authorities: one should not 
litter or loiter, nor paint on the walls. Other norms are less 
often stated, but no less powerful. Women should appear 
genial in public; men should not follow women with whom 
they are unfamiliar closely without announcing themselves; 
groups should not dawdle and block the whole escalator out 
of the subway; adults should not use the curb as a balance 
beam or sing loudly to themselves. 
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The norms of the street, however, are also contested. 
Feminist scholars will argue that women need not respond 
to stranger’s requests for smiles; parkour practitioners 
assert through their movements that they need not treat the 
urban landscape as anything more than a found obstacle 
course. We may contest those norms by flouting them, a 
political act that suggests that what is done does not have to 
be done. Street art may interact with public spaces by 
challenging the norms that govern behavior. The poster 
series Stop Telling Women to Smile (2012) by artist 
Tatyana Fazlalizadeh directly challenges norms concerning 
women’s behavior in public spaces through pasting direct 
messages to street harassers on the walls of the city, but 
even a work like Cargo challenges norms. One does not 
decorate ports with icing; but why not? 
 
In short, we may distinguish between violating a norm and 
contesting it. Refusing to smile when a stranger enjoins it 
violates a norm; but doing so also challenges the norm’s 
status. The refusal to smile indicates that the norm is 
unreasonable. Street art likewise may violate norms con-
cerning the use of public space, but it also challenges them.  
 
We can see from this brief discussion that there must be 
more to an ethical critique of street art than a question of its 
destructiveness or illegality, for a significant part of what 
qualifies as street art is not destructive or illegal so much as 
it simply contests what may be done in a public space. 
Contemporary philosophical models of the ethical criticism 
of art, as we’ll see, struggle to make sense of street art 
because it contests those norms. 
 
2. TWO (AND A HALF) ETHICAL MODELS 
 
At the beginning of the piece, I briefly considered two 
coarse-grained models for the ethical criticism of art. Let’s 
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return to them now in more detail. We might wonder if the 
ethical critique of street art can find any purchase.  
 
A radical ethicist critique of art is hardly defended by 
anyone these days, but such a critique would say that all 
works of street art are aesthetically flawed to the extent that 
they are unethical. As most street art is of questionable 
legality at best, and destructive at worst, all such works 
would be fundamentally aesthetically flawed, rotten in root, 
rotten in fruit. The unfortunate consequence of such a view 
is that street art could be ranked aesthetically based on 
nothing more than their ease of removal from the public 
sphere. Washability may be a great virtue in children’s 
markers, but it is a lousy method of aesthetic appreciation. 
So I will set the radical ethicists aside.viii 
 
The autonomist models hold that: 
 
1. Any ethical properties that can be ascribed to a 
work of art are not aesthetic properties of that work 
of art. 
2. Only aesthetic properties of an artwork are relevant 
to the aesthetic evaluation of an artwork.ix  
  
The aesthetic properties of a street art would be limited to 
those that address its form, skill, and execution. It may 
seem that autonomist critiques would be the most friendly 
to street art, because by setting aside questions of legality 
and destruction, the skill of the artwork can be better 
appreciated, and thus directly compared with artworks who 
have the imprimatur of the artworld. One can imagine a 
purely autonomist critique of Cargo that focuses on the 
astonishing depth of detail and successful mimicry of 
ceramic azulejo tiles, in which the cultural and political 
meaning of the work is set to one side. But if Cargo is 
street art, then an autonomist analysis of Cargo will 
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inevitably incorporate the defining characteristic of street 
art, that the material use of the street is constitutive of the 
internal meaning of the work.  
 
The autonomist can recognize that a given artistic technique 
is destructive or non-destructive, but the destructiveness of 
the technique cannot figure in the aesthetic evaluation of the 
work. Note here, however, that the problem isn’t just that 
autonomous models of critique will set the ethical properties 
of street art to one side when evaluating a given example; we 
should expect that autonomous critiques of art will do that! It 
is that having done so, an autonomous critique will not be 
able to make sense at all of street art, because it is intimately 
integrated with the meaning of shared spaces. Street art 
interacts with those shared spaces and so challenges how a 
public space should be used. Recall that street art does not 
require recognition from the institutionalized artworld, so the 
case for a given work being street art must involve questions 
of its internal meaning. Autonomism would set the ethical 
evaluation of artwork to one side, but in doing so, would 
give up one of the defining characteristics of street art 
entirely. 
 
Ethicist critiques of art allow that the ethical attitudes 
manifested by an artwork figure in any proper aesthetic 
evaluation of that artwork. Like the autonomist critique, the 
ethicist models of art criticism distinguish between the 
aesthetic properties of a work of art and the non-aesthetic 
properties of a work of art. The difference is that where the 
autonomist answers “never” to the question “when do the 
ethical properties of a work of art affect our aesthetic 
evaluation of the work”, and the radical ethicist says 
“always”, the ethicist offers a criterion according to which 
the ethical properties of a work of art may count as aesthetic 
properties. The ethicist critiques need to provide a bridging 
condition such that: 
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1. An ethical property of an artwork affects the 
aesthetic evaluation of the artwork when the 
bridging condition is satisfied. 
 
That is, both the ethicist and the autonomist can observe 
that a given work of art manifests ethical properties. The 
difference is that the ethicist will need to offer a story 
according to which manifesting ethical attitudes can be 
evaluated on aesthetic grounds; he needs to bridge the gap 
between the ethical properties of the work and the aesthetic 
properties of the work. 
 
For example, Carroll argues that a morally defective work 
may be aesthetically flawed in those cases where the moral 
flaw in the work prevents the consumer of the world from 
engaging the work, as when a work prescribes mockery 
when morality prescribes sympathy. The bridging condition 
is the ethical flaws in the work prevent the observer from 
engaging imaginatively with the work. x Gaut offers a 
similar but stronger theory; a work that invites the observer 
to hold an unmerited ethical attitude is pro tanto 
aesthetically flawed,and a work that invites the observer to 
hold a merited ethical attitude is pro tanto aesthetically 
meritorious. The bridging principle is the ethical attitudes 
prescribed by the work are unmerited.xi In neither case are 
ethical attitudes taken to decide the entire aesthetic value of 
a work; a work that is aesthetically flawed due to its ethical 
defects may nevertheless be aesthetically successful when 
taken as a whole. Yet on the ethicist model, an ethical 
defect counts against the aesthetic success of a work, and 
an ethically laudable attitude counts toward the aesthetic 
success of a work. 
 
It seems as if we should have a straightforward algorithm 
for evaluating street art on ethical grounds. Determine the 
ethical attitudes endorsed by the work, determine whether 
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those ethical attitudes are good or bad, determine whether 
those ethical attitudes meet the proposed bridging con-
dition, and then find a way to balance the other aesthetic 
qualities of street art with the aestheticized ethical qualities. 
 
Suppose that one finds an otherwise innocuous graffiti tag 
to be objectionable only because of the damage it does to 
the public space, and one wishes to argue therefore that the 
tag is pro tanto aesthetically flawed. Here is how the 
ethicist might procced. Street art’s material use of the street 
is internal to its meaning, by definition. The material use of 
the street in this case entails vandalism. To commit 
vandalism is to exhibit an ethical flaw, and by committing 
audaciously it in a public space, is to endorse it 
performatively. So the ethicist can extend the concept of 
endorsement to include performative acts, and bringing a 
graffiti tag into existence thereby endorses vandalism. 
Endorsing vandalism is an ethically bad attitude, and 
because it is endorsed, and that the passersby are invited to 
share this attitude, it counts against the aesthetic merits of 
the work.  
 
A quick answer to this objection would distinguish between 
the circumstances of the creation of the work and the 
meaning of the work itself. It is far more plausible that the 
tagger’s audience consists of other taggers, who will judge 
the merits of the work based on its skill, design, and 
audacity. The reactions of the general public are not 
considered in the case of graffiti, because they are 
incidental.xii So while illegality is taken as given, the artist 
does not endorse it. As evidence for this, we might point to 
places where spray-painted street art has become 
unofficially sanctioned, such as at 5Pointz, or in São Paulo, 
and where paint artists and taggers continue to create 
dazzling colorful artworks. Illegality itself thus does not 
factor into the meaning of the work; it is incidental to the 
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ethos of braggadocio that pervades tagging culture. As a 
result, it does not seem correct to say that the tagger invites 
the general public to endorse the spray-painting of 
buildings any more than learning that Hemingway 
composed most of his great works while drunk invites the 
public to endorse the overconsumption of alcohol.  
 
I will say more, however, because while the quick answer 
adequately handles the case of the subculture of graffiti, 
painted artworks directed more toward attracting the 
attention of the general public would be vulnerable to the 
same criticism. Moreover, the strategy of separating the act 
of creation from the internal meaning of the work will not 
be successful with respect to street art, as I will argue, 
because its meaning derives from the use of the street. 
Arguably, if that use is destructive, it should figure into the 
meaning of the work. 
 
The problem with the ethicist model is not that works of 
street art somehow cannot endorse ethically bad attitudes. 
They can, and it seems reasonable that any such model 
could criticize artworks for doing so. The problem is rather 
how the ethicist model develops that criticism. 
Philosophers of art and critics examine a completed work, 
judge its ethical merits, and argue about the resulting 
effects on the aesthetic merits of the work. The models 
assume that the ethical properties and aesthetic properties 
of the work can be neatly distinguished, that both are 
relatively stable, and that then the only question is how to 
characterize the bridging principle by which ethical flaws 
become aesthetic flaws.  
 
The bridging conditions suggested by Carroll and Gaut say 
that ethically bad art becomes aesthetically flawed art when 
the ethical properties of the work interfere with imaginative 
engagement with the work. Both bridging conditions can be 
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fruitfully thought of as cases where the consumer of the 
work experiences imaginative resistance, finding herself 
either unable or unwilling to engage imaginatively with the 
work because of its ethical flaws. When Kipling in “If” 
exhorts the reader to “take up the white man’s burden”, 
modern readers will likely recoil because they do not want 
to countenance racist ideology; and because the work 
prescribes such an attitude which then prevents the reader 
from engaging with the story, the work is thereby pro tanto 
aesthetically flawed.xiii The work would be better if it did 
not endorse the bad ethical attitude. Were we able to draw 
Kipling into the 21st century and advise him to improve his 
poem, we would suggest it would be better to take out that 
cringeworthy line. 
 
Yet in the case of street art, to fail to engage an artwork 
because of its putative illegality does not necessarily 
signify even a pro tanto aesthetic flaw in the artwork. 
Rather, it signifies a failure on the part of the consumer to 
recognize that the illegality of the work likely figures into 
its meaning as a work of street art, and must be engaged in 
order to make sense of it as street art. That is, part of 
whether a skillful street painting or ornamentation qualifies 
as street art rather than a mural lies in how it addresses the 
contested space of the street. To conclude that a work of 
street art is aesthetically flawed because it contests how the 
street might be used is rather to miss the point. 
 
The counterfactual the artwork would be better aesthet-
ically absent this ethical flaw arguably holds in the usual 
cases of poetry, film, and fiction. In the case of some illegal 
street art, however, the counterfactual does not hold; the 
internal meaning of the artwork would be altered by the 
difference in its material use of the street.xiv The problem 
generalizes for any proposed bridging condition. 
 
Vandals or Visionaries? | Willard 
 
110 
 
Moreover, the ethicist model will overlook the subtle 
internal ethics of street art subculture, which often concern 
the norms of public spaces. The feud between the street 
artists known as Banksy and King Robbo provides an 
interesting case. In 1985, King Robbo had created a large, 
colorful graffiti tag on a wall alongside London’s Regent’s 
Canal. “Robbo Incorporated”, as the tag was known, was 
accessible only from the water, and as a result never was 
removed by London authorities.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Robbo Incorporated (1985). Image credit: Photographer 
unknown. Retrieved from: www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/art/features/the-gloves-are-off-graffiti-legend-king-
robbo-has-resurfaced-to-settle-a-score-with-banksy-2270575.html 
 
 
It was the oldest existing tag in London, until 2009, when an 
artist, presumed to be Banksy given the work’s characteristic 
style, stenciled a workman employed in covering up the tag. 
King Robbo, or outraged artists working on his behalf, 
responded by making it appear as if Banksy’s workman was 
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carefully painting a large “KING ROBBO” in homage; the 
response, a simple “FUC” affixed to the front.xv The feud 
escalated, with other works of Banksy’s being altered to 
include messages praising Robbo. 
 
We may interpret the feud as contesting the norm govern-
ing the commitment to ephemerality. Robbo Incorporated 
had been defaced with numerous small tags before 
Banksy’s large stencil work, and consistent with the 
commitment to ephemerality, none of the small tags gave 
rise to any retaliation. The street decides what art survives; 
Robbo Incorporated had survived due to its inaccessibility 
and then, as it aged, as a sort of living monument. The 
question here seems to be whether Banksy, by 2009 an 
internationally famous and wealthy street artist, counts as a 
member of the street who can decide what works succeed; 
or alternatively, if the commitment to ephemerality may be 
reconsidered for artworks of a certain historical stature. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Banksy's Workman (2009). Image credit: Photographer 
unknown. Retrieved from: supertouchart.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/brshamwow.jpg  
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The interesting ethical questions posed by the feud between 
Banksy and King Robbo, while they deeply concern the 
meaning and use of the street, cannot be wholly explained 
by an appeal to their endorsement of ethically bad attitudes. 
Suppose that one holds that committing vandalism is a pro 
tanto aesthetic flaw in a work; then it seems that on the 
ethicist model has to conclude that King Robbo’s work was 
aesthetically flawed, but Banksy’s was not because one 
cannot vandalize an act of vandalism. If the flaw of 
vandalism consists in the damage done to property, 
understood as the cost incurred to restore it, Banksy left the 
wall no worse than when he found it. Such a critique misses 
the point, and so the changing ethical landscape of street art 
cannot be adequately captured by ethicism. 
 
Arguably, the limitation of the ethicist model of aesthetic 
criticism results from its initial focus on institutionally 
recognized works of art. Without question, many forms of 
art also possess their ethical dimensions constitutively. As 
Carroll writes, “…certain kinds of art—for instance, Greek 
tragedies—possess an ethical dimension, not adventitiously 
but constitutively.”xvi Yet if an artistic production is 
recognized by the artworld, it is a work of art, and so we 
can evaluate its aesthetic merits with reference to the 
standards of the artworld’s institutions without initially 
considering its ethical dimensions. Street art, however, has 
no museums and no curators, and so questions of its 
aesthetic merit more closely involve questions of its 
meaning. Given that its meaning concerns the use of the 
public sphere, ethical considerations are entangled in the 
work’s very status.  
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Figure 3. Banksy's work, after alteration by Robbo. Image credit: © 
Matt Brown 2009. Used under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 
license. ww.flickr.com/photos/londonmatt/4222541880/ 
 
 
I suggest that the limitations of the existing models of the 
ethical criticism of art warrant exploration of alternatives, 
and that one promising candidate is modelling the ethical 
criticism of street art as a dialogue about what norms 
should prevail in public spaces. Here, I want to return to 
what I termed earlier non-destructive art, and argue that a 
productive ethical criticism of street art must include 
attention to the conditions of the materiality of the work. 
 
3. A SOFTER, GENTLER STREET ART 
 
 “Urban knitting” also known as “graffiti knitting” or 
“yarn-bombing” is an artistic practice consisting in affixing 
knitted or crocheted work to public spaces. Not all 
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instances of urban-knitting rise to the level of art any more 
than does every spray-painted tag, but those that do easily 
meet Riggle’s requirements; they make material use of the 
street such that the street is internal to the meaning of the 
work, and the works are committed to ephemerality.  
 
Here I will sketch two ways, or interwoven threads, if 
you’ll forgive the pun, in which urban knitting is interesting 
philosophically as an aesthetic phenomenon for its 
incongruity. It is a street art form that exploits the contrast 
between its material and the space in which it is displayed, 
and in so doing creates a dialogue over the ethical use of 
public spaces. 
 
First, urban knitting is incongruous because it takes a craft, 
knitting, traditionally done by women and associated with 
traditional views of women, and injects it into the public 
sphere by imitating the conventions of graffiti, an art form 
generally considered to be aggressive, destructive, and 
associated with masculinity. Second, urban knitting is 
incongruous because while it adopts the conventions of 
graffiti, as yarnwork, it cannot fully inhabit the conceptual 
space cleared by graffiti. The result is that while urban 
knitting depends on graffiti’s existence for its own, its 
existence as a kinder, gentler, non-threatening form of 
street art implicitly criticizes graffiti for its destructive 
effect on public spaces. 
 
The popular image of a knitter, until recently, is that of an 
older woman, making a blanket or baby booties for her 
grandchildren. While the items may be beautiful or 
ornamental in addition to being functional, they are crafts, 
not art. Recently, however, knitting has been reclaimed by 
younger women interested in learning crafts that had 
somewhat fallen by the wayside in contemporary life. It is 
significant that the popular image of a knitter until recently 
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is a grandmother; the skills and interest in knitting skipped 
a generation in the popular imagination (if not in reality), 
only to be rediscovered by hipsters. As Malia Wollan of the 
New York Times observed: “Yarn bombing takes that most 
matronly craft (knitting) and that most maternal of gestures 
(wrapping something cold in a warm blanket) and transfers 
it to the concrete and steel wilds of the urban 
streetscape.”xvii Wollan thus suggests that urban knitting’s 
incongruity lies primarily in the contrast between maternal, 
warm gestures evoked by baby blankets and booties and the 
hard public sphere.   
 
Wollan is correct that urban knitting often exploits the 
incongruity between the cold steel of the street and the 
softness of the yarn. A piece in Denmark, Tank Cozy 
featured a military tank covered with a form-fitting, bright 
pink blanket; from the end of the gun dangled a small 
crocheted cannon ball. Juliana Santacruz Herrera’s 
Boulevard Belleville consists of simple flat knitted cozies 
designed to fill potholes on a number of Paris streets. The 
pieces are perfectly shaped to the potholes, bursting out of 
the street like tiny colorful weeds, suggesting that Paris 
streets could use a bit of tender loving care. Olek’s 
Crocheted Wall Street Bull (2010) covers the famed Wall 
Street icon with aggressively cheerful pink and purple yarn 
that fits it closely, like a stocking. The public space is not 
supposed to be soft, cuddly, and inviting; by placing 
knitworks in the public space, the artist makes us aware of 
that tacit prohibition.  
 
Yet, this contrast alone cannot explain the entirety of their 
incongruity. An additional observation is that urban knitting 
presents for public view craftwork that is typically intended 
for private use. The feminine is associated with the private 
sphere, safely secured behind closed doors; the masculine, 
the outside impersonal world of individuals. A baby blanket 
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might be admired for the skill that produced it but it will be 
admired in a personal, private setting. Knitwork usually is a 
private creation, produced in these days of widely available 
consumer goods as a special hand-made gift, notable 
because of its individuality. It reflects an ethics of care, of 
interpersonal relationships and concern.  
 
Practitioners sometimes refer to the purpose of urban 
knitting as beautifying a public space, by covering a brutish, 
broken, or dingy urban space with colorful yarn creations, as 
in Sayeg’s 2010 covering of a hated public art display in 
Austin. These are all associated with traditional character-
izations of feminine roles, and thus opposed to the public 
sphere. Urban knitting takes what can be conceived as a 
traditional woman’s craft, and instead of confining it to the 
nursery or living room, boldly places it into the public sphere 
for display, a political act. The presentation of the work in 
the street gives rise to its claim to be art; a pattern that would 
be unremarkable in a blanket tossed on a sofa aspires to art 
merely by being presented publicly.xviii  
 
 
 
   Figure 4. Red Monster. Image credit: Author. 
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 If decorating and knitting are coded as feminine, then in 
some cases, urban knitting provides a critique of the use of 
urban space by displaying work akin to those typically 
reserved for the feminine, private sphere. The meaning 
internal to the artwork suggests that the street should be a 
place that welcomes the feminine rather than opposing it. It 
is internal to such works that they comment on the 
contested political sphere. The urban-knitting artist brings 
in the indoors outside and so colonizes the public space. 
Urban-knitting exploits this incongruity to push forward a 
conversation about the question of who owns public spaces.  
 
Another incongruity of urban knitting and other non-
destructive forms of street art lies in their association with 
graffiti. Knitta (originally Knitta Please), the Houston 
group founded by Sayeg adopted many tropes associated 
with graffiti. The name of the group playfully (and perhaps 
cringeworthily) recalls urban lingo, and some group 
members adopted personal tags, or nicknames such as 
AKrylik and PolyCotN, that were inspired by the 
pseudonyms of hip-hop artists and taggers.xix Placing a bit 
of knitwork out in public they dubbed “tagging”; just as a 
graffiti artist might tag a building or bridge, Knitta would 
tag public spaces with yarn. The yarn-bombers seem to 
have worn their urban lingo lightly, tongue-in-cheek, but 
they did seem to see their work as occupying the same 
conceptual space as graffiti, rebellious, of the street, but 
gentler. 
 
Similarly, the artist HOTTEA describes his work on his 
Instagram page as “interacting non-destructively with 
public spaces.” HOTTEA creates, among other works, 
intricate geometric tags out of yarn, usually worked in 
chain link fences. He explained that his use of yarn 
stemmed from a desire as a teenager to participate in street 
art without drawing the attention of the authorities; 
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recalling the one time that he was detained by authorities, 
he said that they could not figure out what laws he might 
have broken and settled on littering as the most likely 
candidate.xx 
 
Associations with urban knitting seem to be largely 
positive, and arguably most of the reason for this is that the 
materiality of the work makes a difference in how it is 
perceived. First, there is a significant perceptual difference 
between a painted object and a covered object. Graffiti 
essentially becomes part of the public space; paint adheres 
to the surface of a wall, but does not obscure the wall like a 
yarn covering does. That is, there is no space between the 
surface of the graffiti and the surface of the wall; the 
graffiti is unified with the public space.  Graffiti is in this 
sense transparent, and so changes the public space.  
 
Urban knitting, by contrast, obscures the public space. 
Urban knitters may refer to their projects as tagging, but the 
pieces function differently. Because they are affixed to the 
surface instead of altering it, they obscure the surface 
instead of changing it. The yarn does not damage the 
surface to which it is attached. At most, its presence is 
temporary inconvenience. It is also easy to remove a 
knitwork from the public space with inexpensive, readily 
available tools; one simply snips away with a pair of 
scissors, and the space is returned to its former state. Knitta 
even fastened some of its pieces with buttons, so that if 
someone objected to the work, it could be easily removed.  
 
Because of this, we may speak of urban knitting as 
covering the public space, but not altering it. When a 
graffiti artist tags a building with spray paint, he or she has 
altered the surface of the building in a way that will require 
significant time, money, and effort to restore it to its 
original state. The artwork claims the public space; to spray 
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a tag is to plant a flag. A graffiti tag seeks to permanently 
alter the public space. As a result, destruction is arguably 
constitutive of graffiti.  
 
Urban knitting, by contrast, is presented as friendly to the 
public space. It inhabits the conceptual space that was 
cleared by graffiti over time and while incurring risk. The 
work of graffiti artists established that it was possible to 
create art by decorating the public space without 
permission. Urban knitting moves into that space, while 
rejecting the destructive nature of graffiti.   
 
The result is an implicit critique of graffiti. Why damage 
someone’s property, it asks, if it is possible to create urban 
art without harming anything? Urban knitting plays with 
the perception of edginess; to the extent that it does so, it is 
rather like a fake tattoo, a bit of rebelliousness that will not 
significantly challenge the artist or the public space. To 
become a graffiti artist involves incurring a significant 
amount of personal risk. Yet without graffiti, almost 
assuredly urban knitting in its current form would not exist. 
 
One result of this second incongruity is that urban knitting 
is an exceedingly safe and accessible form of interacting 
with a public space. One can do it without being a bad 
influence; HOTTEA has showcased his work on the 
children’s television show, Sesame Street; it is hard to 
imagine even an artist as skilled as Banksy being invited 
to demonstrate how to use spray paint! Knitta was 
founded by a middle-class business owner, and urban 
knitting (that may or may not rise to the level of artwork) 
arguably has become an easy way for comparatively well-
off women to participate in street art with minimal risk. 
For example, in the summer of 2014, the Junior League of 
Ogden decided to yarn-bomb the historic district in 
conjunction with the opening of the arts festival. In timing 
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their work to coincide with the arts festival, they signified 
that they thought that what they were doing was not a 
form of guerilla art, working outside the system; they 
obtained permits from the city.xxi Yet the Junior League is 
not a group that one would mistake for a rebellious, anti-
establishment organization; their other volunteer activities 
include organizing community yoga and arts events, 
tending community garden plots, and participating in trail 
races. By contrast, one cannot imagine a group such as the 
Junior League deciding to commemorate the arts festival 
by picking up cans of spray paint and tagging downtown. 
Nor would they get a permit! Graffiti tags must be done 
without attracting the attention of the authorities, because 
even in cases where the tags rise to the level of art, they 
are still considered to be damage to property unless the 
property owner has given consent.  
 
Urban knitting’s claim to being street art occupies the 
conceptual space delineated by graffiti. The success and 
growing acceptability of artistic graffiti makes it acceptable 
to think of art as something that can be done to a public 
space. Yet no one expects that Girl Scout troops and 
women’s leagues will begin spray painting walls; graffiti is 
urban art, and it is arguably constitutive of graffiti that it 
breaks rules and causes some destruction. By contrast, 
urban knitters take advantage of a paradigm that suggests 
that ornamenting the public space is daring and artistic, but 
they do so in a way that incurs no personal risk at all. While 
their actions are technically illegal, it is difficult to imagine 
someone being charged with vandalism or littering for 
placing a cozy on a car antenna. The graffiti artists have 
defined the space aggressively, implicitly arguing that 
tagging the public sphere can be art. Urban knitting moves 
into that conceptual space, while rejecting the destructive 
nature of graffiti. They attempt to inhabit the space without 
endorsing what made it possible. 
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I have been focusing on the critique offered by urban 
knitting directed toward graffiti and other painted street art, 
but graffiti similarly makes a case for the use of the public 
space. Spray painted artwork particularly seems to be 
characterized by aggressive claiming of the public space; 
the permanence of the paint, and the great personal risk that 
artists take work to indicate that using the public space is 
not something that requires permission; nor is it something 
that should be done apologetically, with buttons, in case 
someone objects. It raises the question of the proper 
attitude toward authority, and answers it with a smash. 
 
There is, of course, much more to be said. Any ethical 
evaluations of our perceptions of various forms of street art 
would be incomplete without a discussion of race, class, 
and the severity of penalties for vandalism, and how society 
decides how those factors are relevant. The risk inherent in 
graffiti can challenge those norms; urban knitting is far too 
genteel to do the same. My aim here is much narrower. The 
point is to show that urban-knitting and graffiti are 
participants in a conversation about the ethical use of 
public spaces, and that the material conditions of the art 
help to establish their positions.   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that the classical philosophical models of the 
ethical criticism of art cannot capture what is ethically 
interesting about the phenomenon of street art. Ethical 
models of criticism presuppose the existence of an 
artworld, and view the central problem of the ethical 
criticism of art as the development of a bridging condition 
by which ethically flawed attitudes rise to become aesthetic 
flaws. Street art, however, has no artworld and no curators 
beyond the decisions of the street. Thus, works of street art 
challenge norms concerning the proper use of public space, 
Vandals or Visionaries? | Willard 
 
122 
 
so to criticize the works without attention to that 
conversation overlooks the puzzling and intricate dialogue 
happening right on the walls. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
i Thanks to Christy Mag Uidhir, Nick Riggle, Sondra Bacharach, 
Anthony Chackal, Roy T. Cook, Gregg Horowitz, Alison Lanier, Erich 
Hatala Matthes, Christiane Merritt, Christopher Nagel, Shelby Moser, 
Alison Young, and audiences at the Philosophy of Street Art 
Conference (New York, 2015.) for their perceptive comments and 
stimulating discussion. Thanks also to Jenny Kokai, Sarah Steimel, 
Molly Morin, Janine Joseph, and Julia Panko of Weber State 
University, for their comments on a much earlier draft of this work. 
ii I will discuss radical ethicism, according to which the aesthetic merits 
of a work are wholly determined by its ethical properties, briefly in 
section 4, as such a view seems to be entirely implausible and defended 
rarely in the literature. 
iii I follow the categorization of forms of ethical criticism outlined by 
Carroll, Noel. Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent 
Directions of Research. Ethics, Vol. 110, No. 2 (January 2000), pp. 
350-387. I focus on the autonomous and ethical (or moralist) positions 
because they comprise the largest and most successful models of 
criticism.  
iv Riggle, N.A. Street art: the transfiguration of the commonplaces. The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68:3. Summer 2010, 244-257. 
v Ibid, p. 246. 
vi Ibid, p. 249. 
vii Ibid, p. 248. 
viii I mention this view only because in my experience, it captures the 
first reaction of many people to the ethical criticism of street art. Isn’t it 
vandalism? How can it be art? 
ix See Anderson, J.C. & Dean, J.T., “Moderate Autonomism,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics, (Vol. 38, Issue 2, 1998). 
x See Carroll, N., “Moderate Moralism,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 
(Vol. 36, No. 3, 1996) 
xi Gaut, B. “The ethical criticism of art.” In Aesthetics and Ethics: 
Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson. Cambrige: Cambrige 
University Press, 2000, 182-203. 
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xii I am indebted here to Christoper Nagel’s excellent conference 
presentation “Signature Counterexamples to Institutional Theories of 
Art” for insight into the subculture of graffiti. 
xiii See Gendler, T. S. “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Feb., 2000), pp. 55-81 for an 
overview of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance.  
xiv Carroll’s criterion is quite modest, saying only that a work may be 
flawed aesthetically if its attitudes prevent the consumer from engaging 
with the work. So one might think that his model could handle street 
art, as it is open for him to acknowledge that street art’s illegality often 
prevents consumers from appreciating the work, but that it nevertheless 
does not amount to an aesthetic flaw in street art. This would save the 
view from an initial criticism, but as his weaker criterion will struggle 
to say anything definitive about the relationship between the attitudes 
endorsed by street art and the contested nature of public space, I will 
set it to one side.  
xv I draw my account from: Battersby, Matilda. “The gloves are off: 
Graffiti legend King Robbo has resurfaced to settle a score with 
Banksy.” The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/art/features/the-gloves-are-off-graffiti-legend-king-
robbo-has-resurfaced-to-settle-a-score-with-banksy-6199378.html  
Retrieved 29. Sept. 2015. 
xvi Carroll, N. Art and Ethical Criticism, p. 357. 
xvii Wollan, M. Graffiti’s Cozy, Feminine Side. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/fashion/creating-graffiti-with-
yarn.html. Retrieved 10.1.2014 
xviii This is not to say that all such attempts succeed. As a relatively 
risk-free way to participate in the creation of street art, urban knitting, 
or yarn-bombing as it is typically known when referring to works that 
do not rise to the status of art, has become an activity undertaken by 
college students, women’s groups, and Girl Scout troops; Riggle’s 
definition explains when a work of art qualifies as street art, not that 
everything that meets the criteria of material use of the street and 
ephemerality qualifies as art. 
xix Plocek, K. Knitta, Please!: Hitting the streets with Montrose’s 
craftiest taggers. http://www.houstonpress.com/2005-12-
15/news/knitta-please/ Retrieved 1 October 2014. 
xxRecounted during the artist’s panel at The Philosophy of Street Art 
Conference. Thanks especially to Nick Riggle for asking questions of 
HOTTEA on my behalf when I was late due to travel difficulties.  
xxi Van Valkenberg, N. Ogden yarn bombing explained. The Standard 
Examiner, June 13, 2014. 
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http://www.standard.net/Entertainment/2014/06/13/Ogden-yarn-
bombing-explained.html. Retrieved 30. Sept. 2015 
